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Recent turmoil in the global financial system has impacted severely on the banking sector with 
many banks suffering large losses and necessitating the need to raise additional capital privately 
or  through  their  respective  national  governments.  In  our  study  we  investigate  the  impact  of 
structural  reforms  performed  throughout  the  European  Union  (EU)  accession  process  on 
competition and contestability of banking systems in Romania. 
The literature of the measurement of competition can be divided into two major approaches: 
structural  and  non-structural.  The  structural  approach  to  the  assessment  of  competition 
embraces the „Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis” (SCP) and the „Efficient Structure 
Hypothesis” (ESH). The structural approach, as the name suggests, assesses bank competition by 
examining measures of market structure such as concentration ratios (the share of assets held by 
the top 3 or 5 institutions) or indices (e.g., the Herfindhal-Hirschman index) and supposes that 
higher concentration in the banking market causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to 
higher bank profitability. The SCP model is originally developed by Bain (1956). The second 
approach, ESH, developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzmann (1977) suggests that the superior 
performance  of  the  market  leaders  determines  the  market  structure,  implying  that  higher 
efficiency  produces  both  higher  concentration  and  greater  profitability.  The  non-structural 
indicators of competition are mainly based on the measures of monopoly power developed by 
Lerner (1934). The Lerner Index suggests the mark-up of price over marginal cost. An alternative 
non-structural indicator of the degree of market competition is the Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-
statistic. The H-statistic measures the extent to which changes in banking costs are reflected in 
changes in banking revenues.  
In order to examine the level of competition and market power of banks in Romania for period 
2003  –  2009,  we  estimate  the  non-structural  indicators  and  compare  it  with  the  structural 
indicators of competition.  
In particular, we measure competition using Lerner index and the H-statistic, indicators what are 
estimated using bank-level data and are compared with a standard market structure measure of 
concentration like HHI and CR5. There are no other studies that measure both structural and 
non-structural  competition  indicators  for  Romanian  banking  sector.  Also,  our  assessment 
contains  a  period  of  seven  years  including  the  begging  of  the  implications  of  the  present 
international financial crises on Romanian banking sector. 
The  structural indicators show  continuous  increase  of competition  in  the  Romanian  banking 
system. Lerner index and H statistic demonstrate that Romanian banking system is characterized 
by monopolistic competition and relatively competitive practices. Personnel cost, operational 
cost and financial cost are statistically significant at conventional levels, which imply good fit of 
the revenue equations. The results also demonstrate that excess fixed assets do not generate 
abnormal revenue. 
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In  recent  years  due  to  reform  process,  what  involved  an  ample  process  of  liberalization, 
privatization and recapitalization of the banking sector, the analysis of the competition of banking 
sectors in transition countries from Central and Eastern European countries has received much 
consideration. In our study we investigate the impact of structural reforms performed throughout 
the  European  Union  (EU)  accession  process  on  competition  and  contestability  of  banking 
systems in Romania. Recent turmoil in the global financial system has impacted severely on the 
banking  sector  with  many  banks  suffering  large  losses  and  necessitating  the  need  to  raise 
additional  capital  privately  or  through  their  respective  national  governments.  The  failure  of 
investors, depositors, and supervisors to appropriately discipline banks have led academics and 
policy-makers  to  re-consider  the  links  between  bank  performance,  risk  and  changes  in  the 
competitive environment. Moreover, in recent years, indicators of banking competition had been 
used by researchers to explain performance and risk differentials across banks.  
 
2. Literature review 
The literature of the measurement of competition can be divided into two major approaches: 
structural and non-structural. The structural approach to the assessment of competition embraces 
the „Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis” (SCP) and the „Efficient Structure Hypothesis” 
(ESH). The structural approach, as the name suggests, assesses bank competition by examining 
measures of market structure such as concentration ratios (the share of assets held by the top 3 or 
5  institutions)  or  indices  (e.g.,  the  Herfindhal-Hirschman  index)  and  supposes  that  higher 
concentration in the banking market causes less competitive bank conduct and leads to higher 
bank profitability. The SCP model is originally developed by Bain (1956).  
The second approach, ESH, developed by Demsetz (1973) and Peltzmann (1977) suggests that 
the superior performance of the market leaders determines the market structure, implying that 
higher efficiency produces both higher concentration and greater profitability. "Non-structural 
models" do not infer the competitive conduct of banks through the analysis of market structure. 
The  New  Empirical  Industrial  Organization  approach  rather  recognizes  that  banks  behave 
differently depending on the market structure in which they operate. The non-structural indicators 
of  competition  are  mainly  based  on  the  measures  of  monopoly  power  developed  by  Lerner 
(1934). The Lerner Index suggests the mark-up of price over marginal cost. The higher the mark-
up, the greater is the realized market power. There are a broad range of studies that use the Lerner 
index like Angelini. and Cetorelli (1999), Padoa-Schioppa (2001), Carbo et al., 2003, Maudos 
and Perez (2003), Toolsema (2003), Fernandez de Guevara and Maudos (2004), Carbo et al. 
(2005), Carbo´ et al. (2006); Humphrey et al. (2006), Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2007); Carbo 
and Rodriguez (2007), Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007), Carbó et al. (2009). A number 
of studies have used the Lerner index to try to determine the trend in competitive behavior over 
time. 
An alternative non-structural indicator of the degree of market competition is the Panzar and 
Rosse (1987) H-statistic. The H-statistic measures the extent to which changes in banking costs 
are reflected in changes in banking revenues. It is calculated as the sum of the ratios of the 
percentage change in total revenue (from all sources) to the percentage change in the three input 
prices (funding, labour and capital costs), holding constant total banking output (total assets), 
leverage,  and  two  balance  sheet  composition  variables  (loans  to  assets  and  deposits  to  total 
liabilities).  There  are  a  various  studies  using  H-statistic  measures.  Some  of  them  examine 
competition on European countries like those of Shaffer (1993), Molyneux et al. (1994), Bikker 
and Groeneveld (2000), De Bandt and Davis (2000), Weill (2003), Boutillier et al. (2004), and 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki and Staikouras (2004), Carbó et al. (2009). Claessens and Laeven (2004), 
Bikker and Haaf (2002) assessed competition using H-statistic for a sample of different countries,  
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including European ones. There are also individual country studies: for Germany – Hempell 
(2002), Gischer and Stiele (2008), for Italy – Coccorese (2004), for Greece – Hondroyiannis et al. 
(1999), Coccorese (2005), for Spain – Maudos and Perez (2003), Carbo et al. (2003), for Finland 
– Vesala (1995), for Canada – Nathan and Neave (1989), for Japan – Molyneux et al (1996). 
 
3. Methodology and data used 
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  analyze  the  competitive  conditions  in  the  banking  sector  of 
Romania,  in  light  of  the  reforms  implemented  in  this  country  and  the  immense  changes  in 
Romanian banking system using bank-level data. There are no other studies that measure both 
structural and non-structural indicators for Romanian banking competition. 
In order to examine the level of competition and market power of banks in Romania for period 
2003  –  2009,  we  estimate  the  non-structural  indicators  and  compare  it  with  the  structural 
indicators of competition. In particular, we measure competition using Lerner index and the H-
statistic, indicators what are estimated using bank-level data and are compared with a standard 
market structure measure of concentration like HHI and CR5.  
We estimate the degree of bank market power using bank-level data, the approach followed is 
similar to that of Maudos and de Guevara (2007) and Delis and Tsionas (2009) who defined the 
Lerner index as:  
Lit = (pit − mcit)/ pit  (1) 
where p is the price of total assets computed as the ratio of total revenue to total assets; mc is the 
marginal cost of total assets. In particular, we opt for a modeling framework that allows mc to 
differ across banks and time, using a non-parametric technique to estimate observation-specific 
marginal  costs  from  a  cost  function.  In  particular,  here  we  resort  to  the  estimation  of  the 
following Cobb-Douglas cost function: 
ln cit = a0 + a1ln qit + a2 ln dit + a3 ln wit + εit  (2) 
where c is the total cost of bank i at time t, q is bank output (measured by total assets), d is the 
value of bank deposits, w are the prices of inputs and e is a stochastic disturbance. This cost 
function  assumes  that  banks  use  inputs  and  deposits  to  produce  output  q  (for  a  similar 
implementation, see e.g. Uchida and Tsutsui: 2005; Brissimis et al.: 2008). The marginal cost of 
bank output is simply a1. 
In  the  case  of  perfect  competition,  L=0;  under  pure  monopoly,  L  =  1;  for  monopolistic 
competition L ranges between 0 and 1; and L < 0, implies pricing below marginal cost and could 
result, for example, from a non-optimizing behavior of banks. 
In our application of the Panzar–Rosse approach, the following equation is estimated to assess 









 = α0 + αk logωit
k + xitβ + εit
k=1
K
∑   (3) 
where R is the revenue; TA is the total assets; wk is the unit price of input k; x is a vector of 
control variables; ε is the disturbance term; i and t denote bank and time respectively. The H 
statistic is the sum of α1 to αk in this specification. 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) showed that the H statistic indicates the nature of market structure 
under following assumptions: a) banks are profit maximizing; b) banks produce revenue using 
labour, capital and intermediated funds as inputs; c) higher input prices are not associated with 
higher quality services that generate higher revenue. 
For accurate identification of the H-statistic using an estimated revenue equation based on a static 
equilibrium model, it is necessary to assume that markets are in long-run equilibrium at each 
point in time when the data are observed. Accordingly, the equilibrium profit rate should be 
uncorrelated  with  the  factor  input  prices.  To  test  of  the  market  equilibrium  assumption  we 
estimated in addition following equation:  
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log 1+ Rit ( ) = α0 + αk logωit
k + βxit + βTA logTAit + εit
k=1
K
∑   (4) 
with the variable TA controlled as an explanatory variable.  
The estimated value of H statistic ranges between -∞ and 1. H statistic is smaller than 0 if the 
underlying market is monopoly, it ranges between 0 and 1 for monopolistic competition and an H 
statistic of unity indicates perfect competition. 
In order to estimate the non-structural indicators of competition we used the following set of 
data: a) inputs: personnel expenses, fixed assets and financial capital (sum of total deposits, total 
money market funding, total other funding and equity); input prices: total personnel expenses 
over total assets, other operating expenses over fixed assets and interest expenses over financial 
capital; control microeconomic variables: total capital ratio, equity to total assets ratio, credit risk 
measured as ratio of loan-loss provisions to total loans (LLR_GL), liquidity risk measured as 
ratio of liquid assets to total deposits and borrowing funds (LA_TD); and control macroeconomic 
variables: GDP growth rate – Growth in real GDP in per cent (GDP_G), Inflation rate - change in 
annual average retail/consumer price level in per cent (IR), Level of financial intermediation – 
domestic credit provided by banking sector percentage of GDP (FIN_INT). 
The empirical model specified in equation is estimated using the panel least square fixed effects 
methodology. A second set of models is estimated, GMM data models, to allow comparison of 
results, and as a robustness check. The models are estimated on a panel of 24 commercial banks 
from Romania for 2003 – 2009 period. 
 
4. The results of the research 
The  most  common  structural  measures  of  competition  and  concentration  are the  Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and the n-bank concentration ratio (CRn). The HHI is defined as the sum 
of squared market share of the banks in the market. The upper bound of the HHI is 10.000, which 
indicates a monopoly, and the lower bound is 0 in the situation of an infinite number of banks. A 
market with a result of less than 1.000 is a competitive marketplace, a result of 1.000 – 1.800 
indicates a moderately concentrated marketplace and a result of 1.800 or greater indicates a 
concentrated marketplace. The n-bank concentration ratio (CRn) is calculated as the percentage 
of the market controlled by the top n banks in the market, usually the first three or five banks, and 
the measure takes the share of deposit, loans or assets.  
 
Table 1 Structural indicators of competition in the Romanian banking system for 2003 – 2009 






Share of total 















2003  1251  55.2  39  3387  7 
2004  1111  59.5  40  3031  6 
2005  1115  59.4  40  3533  5 
2006  1165  60.1  39  4470  6 
2007  1041  56.3  42  6340  10 
2008  922  54  43  7375  10 
2009  857  52.4  42  6425  10 
 
As we can see in the Table 1, the concentration of the Romanian banking system has been 
decreasing continuously from 2003 to 2009. This means that the competition in the Romanian  
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banking  system  has  increased  yearly,  especially  due  to  diminishing  of  the  state  capital  and 
entering of foreign capital.  
 
Table 2 Non - structural indicators of competition in the Romanian banking system for 2003 – 
2009 
Model  OLS  GMM 
Lerner index 



















H statistic  0.704426  0.939786 
Note: Standard deviations are presented between brackets.  
*, **, *** indicates significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1%  
 
Table 2 reports the estimates obtained from applying the methodology described above to the 
Romanian banking sector. Most of the input prices reported in Table 2 are statistically significant 
at conventional levels, which imply good fit of the revenue equations.  
The  both  results,  Lerner  index  and  H  statistic,  show  that  Romanian  banking  system  is 
characterized by monopolistic competition and relatively competitive practices. 
The price of fixed assets contributes less to the equation for the H-statistic than the rest of the 
input prices, result in line with the literature (see Molyneux et al. 1994 and Bikker and Haaf 
2002) and it means that excess fixed assets does not generate abnormal revenue.  
Finally,  we  test  for  long-run  equilibrium  using  ROA  as  the  dependent  variable  as  discussed 
above.  The  result  (i.e.  Hn=0)  suggests  that  the  hypothesis  of  equilibrium  is  confirmed  for 
Romanian banking systems. 
 
5. Conclusion 
As the structural indicators show, the concentration of the Romanian banking system has been 
decreasing continuously from 2003 to 2009. This means that the competition in the Romanian 
banking  system  has  increased  yearly,  especially  due  to  diminishing  of  the  state  capital  and 
entering of foreign capital. The Romania’ accession to European Union had an active effect on 
these trends. The both results, Lerner index and H statistic, show that Romanian banking system 
is characterized by monopolistic competition and relatively competitive practices. Personnel cost, 
operational cost and financial cost are statistically significant at conventional levels, which imply 
good fit of the revenue equations. The results also demonstrate that excess fixed assets do not 
generate abnormal revenue. Even if some banks have extended their network aggressively for a 
bigger share of market, they do not account larger revenues yet. Personnel cost and financial cost 
higher contributions to the equation for the H-statistic comparative with operational costs could 
be explained by a intense competition in recruiting and maintaining the personnel (due to head 
hunting and personnel migration) and a high cost of financial resources, due to high cost with the 
minimum reserve requirements and the using of parental undertakings financing as a form of 
profits repatriation.  
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